Robustness of Interdependent Networks: The case of communication
  networks and the power grid by Parandehgheibi, Marzieh & Modiano, Eytan
1Robustness of Interdependent Networks: The case
of communication networks and the power grid
Marzieh Parandehgheibi and Eytan Modiano
Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, MA 02139
Abstract—In this paper, we study the robustness of interdepen-
dent networks, in which the state of one network depends on the
state of the other network and vice versa. In particular, we focus
on the interdependency between the power grid and communi-
cation networks, where the grid depends on communications for
its control, and the communication network depends on the grid
for power. A real-world example is the Italian blackout of 2003,
when a small failure in the power grid cascaded between the
two networks and led to a massive blackout. In this paper, we
study the minimum number of node failures needed to cause
total blackout (i.e., all nodes in both networks to fail). In the
case of unidirectional interdependency between the networks we
show that the problem is NP-hard, and develop heuristics to find
a near-optimal solution. On the other hand, we show that in the
case of bidirectional interdependency this problem can be solved
in polynomial time. We believe that this new interdependency
model gives rise to important, yet unexplored, robust network
design problems for interdependent networked infrastructures.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays infrastructure networks are interdependent in
such a way that the failure of an element in one network may
cascade to another network and cause the failure of dependent
elements. This failure procedure can cascade multiple times
between two or more interdependent networks and result in
catastrophic widespread failures. A particular example is the
interdependency between the power grid and communication
networks; where the 2003 Italian blackout, affecting the lives
of fifty-five million people, was the result of such interde-
pendency [1]. While reliability in networks has been studied
extensively, the focus of most efforts has been on single
networks in isolation. However, coupled networks exhibit very
different behavior than isolated networks due to the cascading
failure effects. In this paper, we develop a simple model for
the interdependency between the networks, and analyze their
robustness.
In order to enhance the reliability of the power grid, it is
essential to have a smarter grid that detects autonomously
faults and allows self-healing [2]. The control of today’s
power grid relies on a supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) system. This SCADA system does not have the
capability to collect real-time data from the entire grid and
analyze it efficiently to make control decisions. It is expected
that future smart grid will need a wide-area measurement
system (WAMS) which uses new technologies such as Phasor
Measurement Units (PMUs) and Sensor and Actuator Net-
works (SANETs) to collect synchronous data, send it to control
centers for making online control decisions, and apply changes
to the grid using devices such as actuators. This complex
control network increases the dependency of the power grid
on communication networks and gives rise to the necessity of
analyzing and designing robust cyber-physical networks [3].
There have been a few attempts at introducing and model-
ing interdependent infrastructure networks. Rinaldi et al. de-
scribe interdependencies among major infrastructure networks
including the power grid and communication networks. In
particular, they show that all infrastructure networks depend on
information delivered by the communication network for mon-
itoring and controlling their subsystems (i.e. SCADA). At the
same time, they show that communication networks depend
on the physical output of other networks; for example, power
from the electric grid for switches or water from the water
infrastructure for cooling systems. These interdependencies are
referred to as cyber and physical, respectively [4].
Later, Rosato et al. studied the Italian blackout of 2003
which affected the lives of fifty-five million people. They
explain that this blackout was the result of a cascade of failures
between the power grid and the communication network. In
fact, due to failures in the power grid, some of the switches in
the communication network lost their power and failed. Sub-
sequently, due to failures in communication network, some of
the substations in the power grid lost their control, and failed.
They also demonstrate that failures inside the power grid lead
to failures in the communication network using simulations on
the real data of the Italian network [1]. Although the papers
by Rinaldi and Rosato explain the concept of interdependency
between networks, neither presents a mathematical model
for investigating the behavior of interdependent networks.
Moreover, there has been some work on the interdependency
within layered communication infrastructure, e.g. between
fiber optical networks and IP networks [5], [6]; but, they did
not consider interdependency between different infrastructures.
In 2009, Buldyrev et al. presented a model for analyz-
ing the robustness of interdependent random networks. They
generate two disjoint random graphs and define a one-to-one
dependency between every pair of nodes in these graphs.
Using techniques from percolation theory, they show that
random failures cascade through the graphs, and investigate
the existence of a giant component [7]. Later, Parshani et al.
showed that reducing the dependency between the networks
makes them more robust to random failures [8]. A discussion
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2of follow-up works on Buldyrev’s model can be found in [9].
However, real networks such as the power grid and the com-
munication infrastructure are not random. These networks have
known topologies; thus, it is essential to understand the impact
of failure cascades in such networks in order to design robust
interdependent infrastructures. To the best of our knowledge,
this paper is the first attempt to model the interdependency
between the networks with known topologies. The focus of
this work is on the interdependency between power grid and
communication networks; however, it can be extended to other
networks with cyber-physical interdependency.
In Section II, we present the network model and define a
new metric for assessing the robustness of networks. In Section
III, we study the interdependency between networks with star
topologies. In Section IV, we evaluate the robustness of a
real network and discuss future research directions, and finally,
conclude in Section V.
II. CYBER-PHYSICAL INTERDEPENDENCY MODEL
We start with a simple model for the power grid and the
supporting Control and Communication Network (CCN). The
power grid consists of generators G and substations S which
are connected with power lines. Similarly, the CCN consists
of control centers C and routers R which are connected with
communication lines. Every router receives power from at least
one substation and every substation sends data and receives
control signals from at least one router. Figure 1 shows the
interdependency model between the networks.
G
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R1
R2
R3
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Power Grid CCN
Fig. 1. Cyber-Physical Interdependency Model - dotted lines represent power
lines and solid lines represent communication lines
In this model, we say that a substation operates if it has
a path to a generator, i.e. receives power, and it is also
connected to a router, i.e. sends data and receives control
signals. Similarly, we say that a router operates if it has a
path to a control center, i.e. sends data and receives control
signals and it is also connected to a substation, i.e. receives
power. Thus, a failure in the power grid may cause a failure
in the CCN and vice versa. For example, future substations
will be equipped with FACTS 1 which control the reactance
of the power lines attached to a substation and prevent those
lines from overloading and failure. These FACTS receive their
1Flexible Alternating Current Transmission System
control through the CCN; thus, the substations connected
to a router will be controlled and do not experience power
overloading. On the other hand, if a substation is not connected
to a router (i.e. is not controlled), it may be overloaded and
fail.
We assume that the power generators have internal control,
and the control centers have backup generators; thus, they are
robust to failures. In addition, in this paper, we do not consider
the power flow equations, and assume that the connectivity of
a substation to a generator is sufficient for receiving power. We
also do not consider the amount of power supply or demand,
and only focus on connectivity. Moreover, without loss of
generality, we assume that there is only one generator and
one control center; this is due to our model’s assumption that
every substation can be connected to any generator, and every
router can be connected to any control centers. Although this
model is not fully realistic, it captures the essential properties
of interdependent networks.
A. Effect of a Single Failure
We start with an example demonstrating that a single failure
can cascade multiple times within and between the power grid
and CCN (Figure 2). Suppose that initially substation S4 fails
(Step 1). As a result, all the edges attached to S4 fail, and
router R3 loses its power and fails (Step 2); Consequently,
substations S1 and S3 lose their control, and router R2 loses
its connection to the control center C, and all fail (Step 3).
Finally router R1 loses its power, and substation S2 loses its
connection to the generator G, and both fail (Step 4).
In contrast, suppose that the power grid is not dependent
on the CCN. In this case a substation fails, if and only if it is
disconnected from the generator. For example, consider only
the power grid from Figure 1 and, suppose that substation
S4 fails It can be seen that no other substation will be discon-
nected from the generator; thus, no further failure occurs. This
example indicates that interdependency makes the networks
more vulnerable, while it is essential to their operation.
It was seen in the example of Figure 2 that a single failure
can lead to the failure of all nodes in both networks. We define
the failure of all nodes in both networks as Total Failure.
This observation leads to an important question. What is the
minimum number of nodes whose removals will lead to total
failure? We define the minimum total failure removals (MTFR)
as a metric that helps to measure the robustness of a network,
i.e. the larger the MTFR, the more robust the network. In
particular, we consider two types of Node and Edge removals
which we refer to as Node-MTFR and Edge-MTFR metrics.
In the case of a single network G = {V,E}, the smallest
set of nodes that can cause a total failure, i.e. disconnect all
the nodes in V from source S, is the set of nodes directly
connected to S. Consequently, a star topology is the most
robust network topology, since all of the nodes in a star are
directly connected to the source.
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(a) Step1 - S4 fails, initially
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(c) Step3 - S1, S3 and R2 fail
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(d) Step4 - R1 and S2 fail
Fig. 2. Cascade of a single failure in an interdependent model
III. INTERDEPENDENCY BETWEEN NETWORKS WITH STAR
TOPOLOGIES
In order to analyze the interdependency between the power
grid and the CCN, we assume that both networks have star
topologies. Under this assumption, all of the substations in
the power grid are directly connected to the generator; thus
no substation’s failure can disconnect the other substations
from the generator. Similarly, all of the routers in the CCN
are directly connected to the control center, and no router’s
failure can disconnect the other routers from the control center.
Therefore, any failure in the system would be only due to
the interdependency between the networks, i.e. a substation
fails if and only if it loses its connection to the CCN, and
similarly a router fails if and only if it loses its connection to
the power grid. This property gives us the opportunity to study
the behavior of interdependent networks, and the effects of
interdependency on the robustness of networks. Since both net-
works have star topologies, the interdependent network under
study has a bipartite topology, i.e. no edge connects the nodes
inside one network. In the following, we consider two distinct
models of unidirectional and bidirectional interdependency.
We analyze the networks under each model, and compare their
complexity and robustness.
A. Unidirectional Interdependency
Under the unidirectional interdependency model, the edges
between the networks are directed, i.e. if a power node Si
provides power for a router Rj , the router Rj does not
necessarily provide the control signal for the same power node
Si (Figure 3(a)). In the following we show that finding the
Node-MTFR is in fact a hitting cycle problem, and prove that
it is an NP-complete problem. In order to do so we start with
the following lemmas:
CCNPower Grid
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(a) Unidirectional Interdependency
CCNPower Grid
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(b) Bidirectional Interdependency
Fig. 3. Graph structure under different interdependency models
Lemma 1: A network with one or more operating nodes has
at least one cycle.
Proof: We prove by contradiction that no node in a
network can operate if there is no cycle in the network.
Suppose that there is no cycle, i.e. all nodes are connected
through one or more paths. First, remove all of the non-
operating nodes; hence, the remaining nodes are operating,
and the network is still acyclic. Now consider the starting
node of one of the paths which is either a substation Si or
a router Rj . This starting node does not have any incoming
edges; therefore, substation Si (router Rj) does not receive any
control (power) and cannot operate which is a contradiction
with the assumption of nodes being operating.
Now we show that existence of at least one cycle is
sufficient to have an operating node. In a bipartite graph, every
4substation (router) in a cycle receives an incoming edge from
a router (substation) in that cycle; thus, the nodes in that cycle
can operate. If all the other nodes of the network receive an
incoming edge directly or through a path starting from a node
in that cycle, those nodes will be operating, too.
Lemma 2: To stop the operation of any cycle, one of the
nodes in the cycle should be removed (Cycles are Stable
Components).
Proof: By definition, every substation (router) in the
bipartite graph remains operating if it has an incoming edge
from a router (substation). Every node in a cycle receives at
least one incoming edge from the nodes inside that cycle;
therefore, the removal of nodes outside the cycle will not affect
the operation of the nodes inside that cycle. As a result, to stop
the operation of a cycle, one of its nodes must be removed.
Note that stopping the operation of a cycle is not equivalent
to stopping the operation of all the nodes inside the cycle. If
the nodes inside a cycle are isolated from the other nodes,
removing exactly one node from the cycle will stop all of
them from operating. However, if nodes inside a cycle receive
incoming edges from other nodes outside of the cycle, more
node removals are needed to cause the failure of all of the
nodes in that cycle.
Lemma 3: For total failure, at least one node from every
cycle should be removed .
Proof: By contradiction - Suppose that there exist a cycle
so that none of its nodes are removed. By lemma 2, all of the
nodes inside that cycle remain operating, which contradicts
the assumption of total failure.
Theorem 1: The minimum number of nodes that hit all of
the cycles in a bipartite graph is the optimal solution for the
Node-MTFR problem.
Proof: Immediate from lemma 3.
Corollary 1: Finding the Node-MTFR in star networks with
unidirectional interdependency is NP-complete.
Proof: By Theorem 1, the Node-MTFR problem is a
hitting cycle problem which is exactly equivalent to the well-
known problem of Feedback Vertex Set (FVS). By definition,
FVS in a graph finds the smallest set of nodes so that their
removals make the graph acyclic; and it is known to be NP-
complete for general graphs [10]. Moreover, Cai et al. proved
that FVS is NP-complete for a special class of bipartite graphs
called bipartite tournament [11]. Therefore, the Node-MTFR
problem which is finding FVS in general bipartite graphs is
also NP-complete.
1) Problem Formulation: It was shown in lemma 3 that
finding the Node-MTFR is a hitting cycle problem. Next,
we present a cycle-based Integer Linear Programming (ILP)
formulation for this problem, assuming that all of the cycles
are given. Let N be a n × 1 binary vector so that each
component Nj takes values 1 if node j is removed and 0
otherwise. Let matrix A ∈ Rm×n be a mapping between the
m cycles and n nodes, where Aij = 1 if cycle i contains node
j and Aij = 0 otherwise. Let e be a m × 1 vector of ones.
The Node-MTFR problem can be formulated as follows.
minimize
n∑
j=1
Nj (1)
subject to A×N ≥ e (2)
Nj ∈ {0, 1}, j = 1, · · · , n (3)
In this formulation, the objective is to minimize the number
of node removals. Every row i of constraint (2) requires that
at least one of the removed nodes should hit cycle i. In the
following, we develop heuristics to solve the problem.
2) Heuristics: Since computing the Node-MTFR is compu-
tationally difficult, we consider approximation algorithms that
give a near-optimal set of node removals in polynomial time.
As explained in section III-A, the node removals problem is
equivalent to a hitting cycle problem. Thus, if we have the set
of all cycles in the graph, we can apply a greedy algorithm
devised for solving the hitting set problem. The input to the
algorithm is the set of cycles (each cycle is defined as the set
of nodes it contains), and the set of nodes in the graph. This
cycle-based algorithm is an iterative algorithm that works as
follows. In each iteration, it removes the node that is shared
among maximum number of cycles, updates the set of cycles,
and repeats until no cycle remains.
This cycle-based algorithm needs the set of all cycles as
input; however, in general, a graph may have an exponential
number of cycles. To overcome this deficiency, we devise a
new algorithm that relies on the degree of the nodes instead of
the cycles. The input to the algorithm is the adjacency matrix
of the graph. The algorithm is iterative: Each iteration starts
with a pruning stage in which the algorithm removes all of
the edges that do not belong to a cycle. In the next stage
of the iteration, it removes the node that has the maximum
outgoing degree. Next, the algorithm removes all nodes that
fail as a result of the cascading effect of that removal. Finally,
the algorithm updates the adjacency matrix of the graph and
repeats the iteration until no node remains.
In the following, we compare the performance of these
algorithms with the optimal solution. We consider a random
bipartite graph with N nodes on each side. Since enumerating
all the cycles requires exponential time, we keep the size of
N small, and limit the graph to have small cycles. To do that,
instead of randomly generating edges, we randomly generate
cycles of size 6 or smaller until all the nodes have at least
one incoming edge. For each value of N , we generate 100
random graphs and then apply our algorithms to each graph
in order to find the minimum node removals. Moreover, for
the optimal solution, we solve the hitting cycle problem as
given by (1)-(3) using CPLEX. As can be seen from Figure 4,
on average, the degree-based algorithm gives a slightly larger
number of nodes compared with the cycle-based algorithm and
optimal solution; however, it is very fast as it does not need
to enumerate all of the cycles.
3) Minimum Edge Removals: An alternative version of
the problem is the minimum number of edges needed to be
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Fig. 4. Comparing different algorithms with optimal solution
removed to cause a total failure. Similar to lemmas 2 and 3,
to stop the operation of any cycle, one should remove one of
its edges, and to have a total failure, at least one edge from
every cycle should be removed. Consequently, we have the
following results:
Theorem 2: The minimum number of edges that hit all of
the cycles is the optimal solution for the Edge-MTFR problem.
Proof: Trivial.
Corollary 2: Finding the minimum edge removals for total
failure in the star networks with unidirectional interdepen-
dency is NP-complete.
Proof: By Theorem 2, minimum edge removals problem
is the edge version of the hitting cycle problem which is
exactly equivalent to the well-known problem of Feedback
Edge Set (FES). Similar to FVS, FES finds the smallest set of
edges whose removals make the graph acyclic, and it is known
to be NP-complete for general graphs [10]. Furthermore, Guo
et al. proved that FES is NP-complete for bipartite tournaments
[12]. Since finding FES in bipartite tournaments is a special
case of the Edge-MTFR problem, the Edge-MTFR problem is
also NP-complete.
B. Bidirectional Interdependency
Under the bidirectional interdependency model, the edges
between the two interdependent networks are bidirectional, i.e.
if a power node Si provides power to router Rj , router Rj must
provide control to power node Si (Figure 3(b)).
Theorem 3: Finding the minimum node removals for total
failure in star networks with bidirectional interdependency is
solvable in polynomial time.
Proof: It is easy to see from Figure 3(b) that edges
are cycles of length two, and hitting cycles of length two
guarantees hitting cycles of larger size. On the other hand,
hitting at least one node in every cycle of size two is equivalent
to finding the minimum vertex cover in bipartite graphs.
By Konig’s Theorem, finding the minimum vertex cover in
bipartite graph is equivalent to maximum matching which is
polynomially solvable [13]. Thus, finding the minimum node
removals in star networks with bidirectional interdependency
is polynomially solvable.
For the Edge-MTFR, all of the edges must be removed. This
is due to the fact that in the star networks with bidirectional
interdependency every edge is a cycle, and cycles are robust
components.
C. Comparing the interdependency models
We have seen that when networks have unidirectional
interdependency, finding the optimal solution for the Node-
MTFR problem is NP-complete; however, it can be solved in
polynomial time when the networks have bidirectional interde-
pendency. Here, we try to explain by way of an example why
the analysis of unidirectional interdependency is more difficult
than bidirectional interdependency. Figures 3(a) and 3(b) show
two networks with the same topology under the different
interdependency models. Suppose that in both networks, node
S1 is intentionally removed. It can be seen that the removal
of S1 in network 3(a) leads to the sequential failure of nodes
R1, S2, R2, S3 and finally R3. However, removal of S1 in
network 3(b) does not cause any failures, as all of the other
nodes still have an incoming edge. Now, suppose that we
want to cause the failure of node R2 in network 3(b). In this
case, all the nodes attached to R2 (nodes S1 and S2) must
be removed. It can be seen that failure of R2 cannot cause
the failure of other nodes as it is already disconnected from
the rest of the network. These observations indicate that in the
case of unidirectional interdependency, a failure can cascade
multiple times between the networks. However, in the case of
bidirectional interdependency, a failure cascades only in one
stage: either from the power grid to the CCN or from the CCN
to the power grid. This makes the analysis of bidirectional
interdependent networks more tractable.
Next we compare the robustness of the interdependency
models. We use the random graphs generated in section III-A2
to generate a new set of graphs with the same topology but
bidirectional dependency. To compare the robustness of the
two models, we find the optimal solution in the unidirectional
graphs by solving the hitting set problem using CPLEX, and
bidirectional graphs by solving the vertex cover problem. It can
be seen from Figure 5 that for all values of N , networks with
bidirectional dependency need more node removals; therefore,
they are more robust to failures. This observation shows that
the existence of more disjoint cycles and shorter cycles makes
a network more robust.
IV. DISCUSSION
We measured the Node-MTFR metric on the Italian net-
work topology shown in [1]2. For the power grid, we only
considered the substations that are directly connected to the
generators. These substations are the most critical nodes as
if they fail, all dependent substations will fail. Similarly, for
the CCN, we only considered the routers that are directly
connected to the control centers (we assumed that the control
centers are located in the highly connected clusters of routers).
Note that under this selection, the power grid and the CCN
2The authors would like to thank professor Rosato for providing the data
for the Italian power grid and communication networks.
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have star topologies. For the interdependency between the
networks, we assumed that every substation receives its control
signals from the nearest router, and every router receives power
from the nearest substation. Figure 6 shows the power grid,
the CCN and the interdependency between the two networks
on the map of Italy.
Under the unidirectional interdependency model, we know
that for a total failure, one should hit of all the cycles. It
can be seen from Figure 6 that the cycles are very short,
and mostly isolated. Therefore, one should remove a large
number of nodes (13 nodes) simultaneously in order to cause
the failure of the whole network. However, if we only consider
the northwest of Italy, it can be seen that one third of the
substations are controlled by a few routers. In fact, removing
only three routers will lead to blackout in one third of the
power grid. This shows that although the network might be
robust to a total failure, only a few node removals can cause
a considerable partial blackout. This observation leads to an
important research direction: Measuring the effects of node
removals on the failure of parts of the network.
Fig. 6. Italian Power grid and CCN; Cycles shown in bold lines.
V. CONCLUSION
We considered the problem of robustness in interdependent
networks. Two networks A and B are said to be interdependent
if the state of network A depends on the state of network B and
vice versa. We considered a cyber-physical interdependency
between the networks in the sense that the nodes in network
A depend on information from network B, and the nodes
in network B depend on the physical output of network A.
The massive blackout in Italy in 2003 was the result of such
interdependency between the power grid and the CCN where
a small failure in the power grid cascaded between the two
networks and led to extensive failures in both the power grid
and the CCN.
We studied the minimum number of nodes that should be
removed from both networks so that all of the nodes in the
networks fail after the ensuing cascades. We formulated this
problem, and proved it is equivalent to the hitting cycles
problem which is NP-complete in the case of unidirectional
dependencies. We also presented polynomial algorithms which
give suboptimal solutions. Moreover, for the case of bidirec-
tional dependencies, we proved our problem is equivalent to
the vertex cover problem in bipartite graphs which is solvable
in polynomial time. We applied our results on the real network
of Italy, and showed that it is robust to total failure. However,
we showed that parts of the network are very vulnerable to
failures.
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